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Differential information economies: REE-equilibrium under contract based approach Full article

Conference XXIII International Conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research
30 Jun - 6 Jul 2024 , Омск
Source Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research: Recent Trends
Compilation, Springer. 2024. 388 c. ISBN 978-3-031-73364-2.
Journal Communications in Computer and Information Science
ISSN: 1865-0929
Output data Year: 2024, Volume: 2239, Article number : 062, Pages count : 22 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-73365-9_15
Tags Differentiated information · Contractual approach · WEE—Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium · REE—Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Authors Marakulin Valeriy 1
Affiliations
1 Sobolev Institute of Mathematics SB RAS

Funding (1)

1 Sobolev Institute of Mathematics FWNF-2022-0019

Abstract: The paper investigates economies with differential information from a contract-based approach developed in a series of author’s papers. It clarifies the key notions of DIE-equilibrium and studies the most significant kinds of core and domination, and their conformity with Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium (WEE) and Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). We also introduce core and equilibrium with differentiated agents (well correspond to conditionally expected utilities). These notions have a close relationship with REE-equilibrium and clarify an appropriate core and a type of stability. Moreover, the paper presents new theorems on core and quasi-equilibria existence.
Cite: Marakulin V.
Differential information economies: REE-equilibrium under contract based approach
In compilation Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research: Recent Trends. – Springer., 2024. – Т.2239. – C.214–236. – ISBN 978-3-031-73364-2. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-73365-9_15 Scopus OpenAlex
Dates:
Published print: Dec 20, 2024
Published online: Dec 20, 2024
Identifiers:
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85214276725
OpenAlex: W4405596890
Citing: Пока нет цитирований
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