Production and Infrastructure Construction in a Resource Region: A Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms for Forming a Consortium of Subsoil Users Научная публикация
| Конференция |
XXIII International Conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research 30 июн. - 6 июл. 2024 , Омск |
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| Сборник | Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research : 23rd International Conference, MOTOR 2024, Omsk, Russia, June 30–July 6, 2024, Proceedings Сборник, Springer Cham. Switzerland.2024. 464 c. ISBN 978-3-031-62792-7. |
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| Журнал |
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN: 0302-9743 , E-ISSN: 1611-3349 |
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| Вых. Данные | Год: 2024, Том: 14766, Страницы: 374-389 Страниц : 16 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-62792-7_25 | ||
| Ключевые слова | Stackelberg game, bilevel mathematical programming problems, strategic planning, public-private partnership, a consortium of subsoil users, metaheuristics, coordinate descent | ||
| Авторы |
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| Организации |
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Информация о финансировании (1)
| 1 | Российский научный фонд | 23-28-00849 |
Реферат:
The paper considers the model of formation of a program for the development of the mineral resource base of a resource region based on public-private partnership. The key element of the program is the mechanism of creating a consortium of private investors, jointly implementing projects for the construction of the necessary production infrastructure. Two variants of consortium formation are considered. In the first case, the consortium is formed “top-down” by the government, which creates a management company. Its goal is to find a compromise between the interests of the government and subsoil users, providing the maximum possible budgetary flow. The second variant substantially assumes the formation of the consortium “from the bottom up” on the initiative of subsoil users. In this case, private investors themselves form a management company. It ensures rational sharing of infrastructure costs and, in dialogue with the government, seeks to maximize the amount of natural resource rent they receive. Both mechanisms formally fit into the Stackelberg game scheme. The corresponding bilevel mathematical programming problems are solved using metaheuristics based on coordinate descent. The numerical experiment carried out on real data of the Zabaikalsky Krai allows us to compare the ways of consortium formation and formulate practical recommendations for the economically unobvious choice of partnership architecture.
Библиографическая ссылка:
Lavlinskii S.
, Panin A.
, Plyasunov A.
, Zyryanov A.
Production and Infrastructure Construction in a Resource Region: A Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms for Forming a Consortium of Subsoil Users
В сборнике Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research : 23rd International Conference, MOTOR 2024, Omsk, Russia, June 30–July 6, 2024, Proceedings. – Springer Cham., 2024. – C.374-389. – ISBN 978-3-031-62792-7. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-62792-7_25 Scopus OpenAlex
Production and Infrastructure Construction in a Resource Region: A Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms for Forming a Consortium of Subsoil Users
В сборнике Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research : 23rd International Conference, MOTOR 2024, Omsk, Russia, June 30–July 6, 2024, Proceedings. – Springer Cham., 2024. – C.374-389. – ISBN 978-3-031-62792-7. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-62792-7_25 Scopus OpenAlex
Даты:
| Поступила в редакцию: | 27 февр. 2024 г. |
| Опубликована в печати: | 18 июн. 2024 г. |
| Опубликована online: | 18 июн. 2024 г. |
Идентификаторы БД:
| Scopus: | 2-s2.0-85198439374 |
| OpenAlex: | W4399742869 |
Цитирование в БД:
Пока нет цитирований