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A brief proof of the existence of an alpha-core for generalized strategic games. Full article

Conference XXIV International conference “Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research”
07-11 Jul 2025 , Новосибирск
Journal Сибирские электронные математические известия (Siberian Electronic Mathematical Reports)
, E-ISSN: 1813-3304
Output data Year: 2025, Volume: 22, Number: 2, Pages: 46-53 Pages count : 8 DOI: 10.33048/semi.2025.C04, MSC 91A06, 91A10
Tags generalized strategic game, $\alpha$-core, Brouwer's fixed point theorem
Authors Marakulin V.M. 1
Affiliations
1 Sobolev Institute of Mathematics

Funding (1)

1 Sobolev Institute of Mathematics FWNF-2022-0019

Abstract: This paper studies the problem of whether an $\alpha$-core exists (is non-empty) for generalized normal-form games where player payoffs are described by point-to-set convex-valued, irreflexive, and weakly continuous preferences. We propose a short effective proof of the non-emptiness of the core; it based on a contradiction with Brouwer's theorem on the existence of a fixed point for a continuous mapping of a convex compact set into itself.
Cite: Marakulin V.M.
A brief proof of the existence of an alpha-core for generalized strategic games.
Сибирские электронные математические известия (Siberian Electronic Mathematical Reports). 2025. V.22. N2. P.46-53. DOI: 10.33048/semi.2025.C04, MSC 91A06, 91A10
Dates:
Accepted: Jun 1, 2025
Published print: Dec 31, 2025
Published online: Dec 31, 2025
Identifiers: No identifiers
Citing: Пока нет цитирований
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