Реферат: A sequential game of the Stackelberg type with three players is considered. The first player is a leader company. It assigns prices in its facilities for a homogeneous product. Next, a follower company sets prices in its facilities. After that, each client chooses a service facility by minimizing the purchase and transportation costs while taking into account his financial resources (budgets). Each company aims to maximize its profit from product sales. The goal of the game is to find such a feasible solution and such a maximum deviation from the clients’ budgets that the leader’s profit is not less than a given threshold. Uniform and discriminatory pricing strategies are considered. In the uniform strategy, the same price is set in all facilities. In the discriminatory strategy, the company determines its service price for each client in each facility. It is proved that the problem is polynomially solvable under pricing strategies described above. Corresponding polynomial algorithms are proposed. The work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (project 23-21-00424)

Библиографическая ссылка: Drachev R. , Panin A. , Plyasunov A.
Polynomially solvable cases of a threshold stability problem for competitive pricing
XXIII International Conference Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research 30 Jun - 6 Jul 2024